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Cases and Guidelines in Genetics
Roger B. Dworkin*
The human genome has been mapped. Pre-symptomatic diagnosis for an ever-
increasing number of genetic diseases is a reality. Gene therapy is in the early
stages of development. Mammalian cloning has been performed, and human clon-
ing seems inevitable. Embryonic stem cell research promises important new weap-
ons in the war against disease. Humanity's genetic future is bright indeed.
Nonetheless, as I have noted before, 1 every silver lining has a cloud. A genetic
map may teach us things we do not wish to know about ourselves and may lead to
an inaccurate sense of genetic determinism or (more frightening) to an accurate
recognition that life is far more determined than we choose to believe or than our
legal systems presuppose. Pre-symptomatic diagnosis can be a curse as well as a
blessing if it leads to knowledge of an adverse genetic fate that cannot be avoided
or mitigated. Advance knowledge can also lead to advance labeling and the discri-
mination that may accompany it. Gene therapy may lead to genetic enhancement,
the creation of a permanent genetic underclass, or permanent damage to humani-
ty's gene pool. So too, cloning can be used for stupid or evil purposes to modify
and commodify human beings. Stem cell research can lead to the creation of abor-
tion factories and a market in embryos.
When science and technology promise as much good and threaten as much po-
tential harm as genetic developments do, the desire to regulate the developments is
easy to understand. Accomplishing sound regulation is much more difficult. Those
who are fearful and pessimistic about genetic developments, but trusting and opti-
mistic about the law will advocate bans on genetic developments and prohibitions
on certain uses of genetic information and will advocate serious penalties to sup-
port the bans and prohibitions. Genetic optimists and those who have less faith in
law will advocate unrestrained technological growth and see little room for bans
and prohibitions. Sound policy will reject both extremes and attempt to devise ap-
* A version of this article was presented at an International and Interdisciplinary Sympo-
sium, "International Guidelines in Genetics," which was held in Lutherstadt Wittenberg, Ger-
many, October 26 - 30, 2000. I am grateful to the organizers of the symposium and to its par-
ticipants for their helpful discussion of the ideas contained in this article.
I Roger B. Dworkin, "Common Sense and Common Decency: Some Thoughts about
Maternal-Fetal Conflict," in James M. Humber/Robert F. Almeder, eds: Biomedical Ethics
Reviews, Totowa, N.J.: The Humana Press, Inc., 1991, 9.
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proaches that permit society to reap maximum benefit from new genetic technolo-
gies while minimizing their risks and costs. Sound policy will advert to the real
strengths and weaknesses of legal approaches to rapid scientific and technological
change rather than rely on unexamined optimism or pessimism.
Two obvious, but quite different approaches to policy formulation suggest them-
selves: the enactment in advance of provisions, whether they be called rules, regu-
lations, or guidelines, that are designed to control conduct; and the resolution of
particular cases as they arise. To some extent the appeal of these approaches may
depend on the legal tradition with which one is most familiar. Decision making in
advance may be more attractive to civil lawyers, while case by case adjudication
has a prima facie appeal to common lawyers. However, civil law has room and ob-
vious need for case resolution, and common law countries rely increasingly on leg-
islation and administrative regulation to supplement the system of case by case ad-
judication. Moreover, if legal decisions about genetic developments are to have glo-
bal application, some accommodation among legal approaches will be necessary.
Whether global application is desirable is an important and difficult question. It
can only be answered after general consideration of the nature of genetic develop-
ments and the legal tools that are available to deal with them.
2
I. Genetic Developments
The most striking feature of genetic developments is the breathtaking speed with
which they are occurring. It is still less than half a century since Watson and Crick
discovered the double helix structure of DNA,3 and only a quarter of a century
since the development of recombinant DNA technology and the fears it spawned,4
all of which have turned out to be unfounded. The human genome was mapped
several years more quickly than anticipated. 5 Scarcely a day passes without ordin-
ary news media, let alone scientific journals, reporting some mind boggling new
genetic development.
A second characteristic of genetic developments is that there are many of them
and that the facts relevant to each development and the issues it poses are different.
2 See section IV. Cases and Guidelines.
3 James Watson/Francis Crick, "Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid", 171 Nature 737 (1953); James Watson, Double Helix: A Perso-
nal Account of the Discovery of DNA, New York: Atheneum, 1968.
4 See, e.g., David A. Jackson/Stephen P. Stich, eds., The Recombinant DNA Debate, Eng-
lewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979; John Lear Recombinant DNA: The Untold
Story, New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1978; Symposium, Biotechnology and the Law:
Recombinant DNA and the Control of Scientific Research, 51 S. Cal. L.Rev. 969- 1554
(1978).
5 See generally, Genome Announcement a Milestone, but Only a Beginning, CNN.com.-
health (June 26, 2000).
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Even a "single" issue, like whether to permit presymptomatic diagnosis of chil-
dren, may require different analysis depending on whether there is a medical treat-
ment for the condition one is thinking about diagnosing.6 How effective the treat-
ment is, its costs, risks, etc. may also be relevant. And, of course, as noted above,
all of those facts will change very quickly. Obviously, other issues - whether to
permit germ-line therapy, how much to protect genetic privacy, which research to
promote, and so forth - involve different factual considerations. Some of the rele-
vant facts, like those involved in protecting privacy, require understanding an addi-
tional, rapidly changing scientific field, computer science.
Third, many of the facts that must be understood to deal with developments
in genetics are scientific facts. This obvious observation is very important because
it suggests that potential lawmakers are unlikely to have a good understanding
of the facts. The rapidly changing nature of the scientific facts exacerbates this
problem.
Fourth, genetic developments are characterized by uncertainty and by human
ignorance about what they portend. As I have noted previously, acting in the face
of ignorance is fraught with difficulties and suggests modesty and efforts to over-
come one's natural optimism or pessimism unrooted, as they often are, in informa-
tion7.
Fifth, the implications of genetic developments and of efforts to regulate them
are enormous. Many of them are probably beyond our imagination. Genetics may
contain the power to reshape our lives and our societies and to require rethinking
our most cherished beliefs as we confront anew the old nature-nurture and free will
debates. The implications of regulatory developments are scarcely less far reach-
ing. The legal steps we take in the next decade may either deprive humanity of
spectacular benefits to health, food production, self-understanding, and reformu-
lated societies, or may let loose upon us forces that will destroy much of what we
cherish about human beings. One ignores legal consequences at his peril, just as
much as one ignores genetic developments at his peril. Law is not cost free. Each
legal approach has different costs and different benefits.8 Potential lawmakers and
their consultants must be ever vigilant to avoid allowing enthusiasm for substance
to cause them to forget that in areas of regulation and law what one does is seldom,
if ever, as important as how one does it.9
6 See, David H. Smith/Kimberly Quaid/Roger B. Dworkin/Gregory P Gramelspacherl
Judith A. Granbois/Gail H. Vance, Early Warning: Cases and Ethical Guidance for Presymp-
tomatic Testing in Genetic Diseases, Bloomington / Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1998, pp. 72-89, 163-166.
7 Roger B. Dworkin, "Law and Ignorance: Genetic Therapy and the Legal Process", 4
Jahrbuch fir Recht und Ethik/Ann. Rev. of Law and Ethics 49 (1996).
8 See generally, Roger B. Dworkin, Limits: The Role of the Law in Bioethical Decision
Making, Bloomington/ Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996.
9 Ibid., p. 6.
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Finally, genetic developments raise issues as to which there is no moral consen-
sus but much heartfelt moral belief. Many genetic-social issues have power to po-
larize not unlike the abortion issue. Lawmakers must be vigilant to avoid adopting
one of several legitimate competing moral views and imposing it on those who do
not share it.
How then ought societies to respond to a collection of issues that are character-
ized by rapidly changing, scientific facts; a high level of uncertainty or ignorance;
extraordinary and only partly foreseeable permutations; and deep moral convic-
tions but no moral consensus? When dealing with such an area the likelihood of
error is great, and the costs of errors can be enormous. The goal should be to at-
tempt to devise approaches that reduce both the number and size of the errors and
that leave opportunities for errors to be corrected. In devising such approaches one
must remember that two types of errors are possible - excessive permissiveness
and excessive restrictiveness. Eagerness to avoid one kind of error should not be
allowed to lead to the other. Are guidelines or case resolutions more likely to re-
duce the number and costs of errors?
II. Guidelines
There is an obvious attractiveness to being able to deal with problems in ad-
vance. Doing so makes us feel that we are in control of our fate, and it offers the
prospect of avoiding harm rather than cleaning up after harm has already occurred.
Advance decision making may be assigned to a wide variety of decision makers. It
can be democratic, it can cede control to experts, or it can adopt some combination
of popular and expert control. Advance decision making can also take many differ-
ent forms - criminal legislation, administrative controls, tax and/or spending poli-
cies, government recommendations, recommendations and/or ethical mandates
from private groups, and so forth. Sound decisions about whether to rely on ad-
vance decision making instead of case by case decision making require attention
both to the general characteristics of advance decision making and to specific char-
acteristics of particular methods of dealing with issues in advance.
All forms of advance decision making assume that the decision makers under-
stand enough about the subject they are addressing to make sensible decisions
about it. This does not necessarily mean that the decision makers must themselves
be experts in the field. Experts usually gain their expertise by working in a field.
Therefore, regulation by experts is likely to become regulation by the regulated.
That is, the group to be regulated will capture the regulatory process, and the law
will have a fox-guarding-the-chicken-coop quality. Rather than require regulation
by experts, sound decision making requires (1) that an area be sufficiently devel-
oped so that experts can know a reasonable amount about its promises and pitfalls
and can communicate that information to laypersons; and (2) that lay decision ma-
kers have the benefit of expert information and consultation. Most genetic devel-
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opments do not meet this requirement. Both the fears and the enthusiasms sur-
rounding gene therapy, presymptomatic diagnosis, stem cell research, human clon-
ing, etc. are largely hypothetical.
Genetic ignorance is only part of the problem. Other forms of ignorance are re-
levant too. For example, how to deal with workplace genetic screening and con-
cerns about employment discrimination and invasions of privacy in the workplace
requires knowledge about the actual practices of employers. First, potential regula-
tors must know the extent to which screening, diagnosis, etc. are feasible and how
much they cost. Second, they must know the extent to which employers and in-
surers use genetic information or what scientific and technological advances might
move them to use it. Then they must know the likely outcome of such use on indi-
viduals and on society as a whole. For example, in a full-employment society fears
of genetic discrimination in employment are probably overblown. In recessionary
times they may be a cause for greater concern.
Advance decision making tends to be abstract and general. As it is not restricted
to specific cases, it necessarily paints with a broad brush. This makes it useful for
dealing with problems that are susceptible to comprehensive resolutions and that
are not characterized by factual differences. As discussed above, genetic develop-
ments do not meet this criterion.
Advance decisions assume a fair level of certainty and a willingness to bind the
future. Thus they are ill-suited for dealing with issues like those posed by genetics,
which are characterized by rapid change and both factual and moral uncertainty.
Thus, advance decision making seems ill suited for dealing with developments
in genetics. Nonetheless, some kinds of advance decision making are less ill suited
than others.
Criminal legislation is almost surely the worst way to deal with genetic develop-
ments. As Herbert Packer pointed out more than thirty years ago,10 criminal sanc-
tions, which, by definition, involve the intentional infliction of suffering by the
state, are morally ambiguous and require substantial justification. They are inap-
propriate in the face of legitimate debate about the morality of the conduct they
propose to regulate. They also cannot be justified unless they will serve the goal of
crime prevention and impose relatively minor costs in terms of enforcement, un-
equal application, and benefits foregone. Criminalizing genetic research or appli-
cations would serve none of these goals. It would inflict punishment on conduct
that many persons do not oppose and that some may find morally required.11 It
would run the risk of depriving humanity of great benefits. It would be largely un-
enforceable, given the worldwide nature of the scientific enterprise. Demand for
10 Herbert L. Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford, CA.: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1968.
11 E.g., Ronald Munson & Lawrence H. Davis, "Germ Line Therapy and the Medical Im-
perative", 2 Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 137 (1992).
3 Jahrbuch fir Recht und Ethik, Bd. 10 (2002)
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the good that genetic research promises would preclude strict enforcement. Rather
than eliminate genetic research, criminalizing it would force it underground and
create a "crime tariff," 12 under which the price of genetic research and services
would increase and be funneled to the least savory members of society, those who
are willing to break its laws. Moreover, criminal legislation, like all legislation, is
hard to write narrowly. It is difficult to imagine statutes that would be fact sensitive
and avoid painting with too broad a brush. Some genetic research and applications
may be undesirable, but it is hard to believe that all of them are. An approach that
prohibits all, or even one that prohibits enough to be threatening to all is too
sweeping to be desirable. Finally, criminal legislation, like all legislation, is diffi-
cult to change. Once enacted, it is likely to remain on the books for many years.
Thus, if it turns out to be ill-considered or undesirable legislation, a society will
probably be stuck with its mistakes for quite a long time.
Administrative regulations are more attractive. They are easier to tailor to speci-
fic concerns and specific factual situations than criminal legislation; they are likely
to be developed with the participation of persons with more expertise than most
members of legislatures have; they need not involve the moral condemnation and
punishments that characterize the criminal law; and they may be easier to change
in response to new information and insights than legislation is.
Nonetheless, administrative regulations are far from a perfect response. They
are often difficult, expensive, and slow to enact. They may unduly represent the
perspectives of those who are involved in the field and therefore in a position to
have expertise to share. They can only be enacted after legislatures have authorized
an agency to act. This means that they may become caught up in the quagmire of
politics. And, of course, they need some enforcement mechanism. That means that
persons not subject to their jurisdiction may escape their thrust, as private research-
ers may be able to avoid some of the strictures of American stem cell research pol-
icy.13 And it means that they are unlikely to be effective in the international arena.
Specific governmental policies, such as deciding to promote certain kinds of ge-
netic research by funding it or to discourage it by taxation require the enactment of
legislation, which probably would have to be supported by administrative regula-
tions. Thus, the basic question of whether to deal with specific conduct in advance
or after the fact has to be resolved before specific fiscal policy issues can be ad-
dressed.
Recommendations are unenforceable, and ethical proscriptions are enforceable,
if at all, only against limited groups of persons. This is both their greatest benefit
and their greatest drawback. The fact that they affect few people and are relatively
undraconian means that they are unlikely to cause much loss of progress; the cost
of relying on them in terms of benefits foregone will be low. Conversely, the costs
12 Packer, (op. cit. fn.10), pp. 277-282.
13 See, National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Re-
search: Executive Summary, Rockville, MD.: 9- 10, 1999.
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in terms of dangers unprevented will be high. Ethical pronouncements are unlikely
to persuade the unpersuaded or to control persons not subject to the authority of
their authors. Moreover, ethical pronouncements are likely to be the products of
particular, interested groups. Therefore, they are unlikely to represent a broad en-
ough set of considerations to end up representing the best social policy.
Thus, at first blush advance regulation of developments in genetics seems to be
a mistake. Is after-the-fact case by case adjudication likely to be more satisfactory?
III. Cases
Case by case decision making 14 is premised on the ideas that (1) the best deci-
sions are those that are rooted firmly in facts that are known at the time the deci-
sion is made; (2) narrow decisions are better than broad ones; and (3) decisions
should be relatively easy to change. In case by case decision making consistency is
to be achieved through careful comparison of facts rather than through the applica-
tion of pre-determined principles, and some inconsistency is considered to be toler-
able in the name of practicality. Cases, like advance decisions, can be resolved by
a variety of different decision makers. While common law judges are the paradig-
matic case deciders, 15 administrative agencies can also decide cases one at a time;
IRBs and peer review committees decide individual cases with varying degrees of
guidance from preexisting regulations. Professional scientific groups, interest
groups, and those who offer ethical guidance can do so by deciding cases instead
of or in addition to adopting codes of conduct. How suitable are genetic develop-
ments to resolution through case by case decision making?
To the extent that genetic developments offer largely unknown benefits and pose
largely unknown threats, case resolution is an attractive response because it can
avoid adopting far-reaching decisions that will bind the future. The power of a case
is confined to its facts and to analogous situations that develop after it was decided.
Individual decisions are more likely to end up being sound than are individual
advance pronouncements. That is because being tied to facts often gives the deci-
sion maker enough information to resolve problems correctly. They are unlikely to
go off on flights of fancy. To put it another way, case by case decision making in
genetics is unlikely to commit the sin of science fiction. If cases are wrongly
decided, they offer another benefit: They are easy to change. 16 The very fact that
14 For a wonderful discussion of casuistry, see, Albert R. Jonsen/Stephen Toulmin, The
Abuse of Casuistry, Berkeley / Los Angeles / London: University of California Press, 1988.
15 For a thorough analysis of common law methodology, see, Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The
Nature of the Common Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988; see also
Dworkin, (op. cit. fn. 8) pp. 7 - 10.
16 This is not true of decisions that are made by some judicial bodies, like the United
States Supreme Court. That court is a hybrid body that decides cases, but that does so on the
basis of a preexisting set of principles (the United States Constitution) and that purposely
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the implications of cases are not very far reaching means that the costs of changing
them are relatively small in terms of upset expectations and disruption of people's
lives. Moreover, wrongly decided cases often do not have to be changed. Rather
than overruling a previous decision, the decision maker can often distinguish the
decided case from the pending one. Eventually, so many distinctions can be drawn
that the wrongly decided case will in essence have been distinguished out of exis-
tence.
Sound case decision making requires the decision maker to provide reasons for
the result that is reached. This process of reasoned elaboration is a valuable feature
of a casuistical approach. It allows others to evaluate decisions to consider whether
they should be changed. It facilitates careful distinctions among cases as persons
deciding cases after the first one has been resolved can apply the fundamental prin-
ciple that if the reason(s) for a rule do not apply, the rule does not apply. Moreover,
the reasons elaborated in the decision of a case can be treated like entries in an
intellectual discussion of a topic, much like journal articles. Thus case resolutions
contribute to an understanding of social problems and their possible solutions.
Most importantly, the requirement that a decision maker provide reasons to support
a decision guarantees that there are reasons to support the decision. It is an impor-
tant check against arbitrariness and prejudice.
Guidelines and other forms of advance decision making do not normally require
that reasons be provided. For example, a statute need not explain its rationale. Leg-
islative history may or may not exist. Even when it does exist, it has little authority
and is unreliable, reflecting, as it does, only what those members of the legislature
who chose to speak, chose to say. In case by case decision making, however, the
reasoning of the decision maker is the essence of the decision.
A related point is that statutes and other forms of advance decision making mean
what they say, and no more. There are many theories about how to discern what a
statute means. However, a statute is always limited by some understanding of its
words. That is all it has. Since statutes and other advance decisions have no facts,
they have no analogies. They cannot legitimately be applied to instances they do
not address. This makes them less useful than cases, which do have facts. Facts
and reasoning permit analysis of which future cases are analogous to those that
have already been decided. This permits the development over time of a richly
nuanced, highly particularized set of decisions that can never be matched by a set
of decisions made in advance.
Of course, none of this is to say that cases are perfect. Case by case decision
making is slow, backward looking, poor at controlling conduct, and likely to be
shot through with inconsistencies.
attempts to develop long range, widely applicable, nationwide, hard to change solutions to
problems. A better model of case by case decision making is a state appellate court resolving
a common law dispute. For a fuller explanation of the difference between common law and
constitutional adjudication, see, Dworkin (op. cit. fn. 8) pp. 7-10, 15-18.
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Deciding cases is a slow way to deal with problems. Before a case can arise a
technology must exist and have operated to somebody's perceived detriment so
that the aggrieved person brings a case for relief. The decision rendered will re-
solve one dilemma, but the next problem will not be solved until the next case
arises. Developing a substantial body of precedent may take years, decades, or
even centuries.
The process may be speeded up considerably if a group of decision makers seeks
out cases to resolve without waiting for litigation to arise. For example, a group of
scholars may find cases (incidents) that raise genetic ethical dilemmas in various
genetics clinics and laboratories. They can then attempt to resolve the cases even if
no one has sought relief for a grievance.1 7 The problem with this approach, as with
all approaches that do not have the force of law, is that nobody will be bound by
the group's case resolutions. Speed will be offset by unenforceability.
Cases may be poor vehicles for dealing with rapidly changing issues like those
posed by genetic developments not only because the developments must exist and
appear to harm someone before a case can be decided, but also because casuistry is
based on allegiance to the past. The decision maker must look for wisdom in pre-
cedent and analogy, which is likely to have little to contribute to a debate about
cutting edge scientific and technological developments.
A system that is dependent on cases is necessarily dependent on the order in
which cases arise. That means that cases are unlikely to be decided in a logical
order, that resort to first principles is unlikely, and that there will always be gaps
and inconsistencies in the body of case determinations.
Finally, conduct control requires that people be told clearly, in advance, what
they are supposed to do and refrain from doing. Cases, which are decided after
conduct has already occurred, and which are in a very real sense only authoritative
for their own facts, are poor tools for controlling people's conduct. How is actor #2
supposed to know whether the decision maker will find his case enough like that
of actor #1 to reach the same result? His uncertainty may lead either to timidity, an
unwillingness to act because of fear that unwelcome law may apply, or boldness
because of the hope that it will not. What uncertainty will not do is lead to behavior
that follows a policy preference that society has predetermined.
IV. Cases and Guidelines
Neither case by case decision making, nor advance decision making seems ide-
ally suited to dealing with issues posed by genetic developments. This is hardly
surprising. Existing legal mechanisms are not very well suited to deal with many
of the social issues posed by biomedical advance.18 Issues from abortion to death
17 See, e.g., Smith, et al. (op. cit. fn.6).
18 See generally, Dworkin (op. cit. fn. 8).
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facilitation demonstrate the limits of the law's ability to deal with rapid change. As
usual, this leaves us in the uncomfortable position of choosing how to do the least
harm.
Recognizing that one's goal is to do the least harm, rather than to reach the ideal
solution to a problem, is very important. Changed aspirations change the weight of
arguments. If one believes that there is a perfect solution to a problem, then one will
always be bedeviled by loose ends and the second best. An argument that one's so-
lution leaves some undesirable result or possibility in place will be a powerful cri-
tique. If, however, one is attempting to do as little harm as possible, unsolved pro-
blems are a minor annoyance. This is especially true of unsolved hypothetical pro-
blems. Lawyers and ethicists yield to no one in their ability to make up problems.
Hypothetical problems do not have to be solved. Real problems are hard enough to
deal with. Moreover, excessively enthusiastic efforts to deal with hypothetical pro-
blems can create entirely new problems. An example should make the point.
Anyone who thinks in the abstract about artificial insemination by "donor"
(AID) of a married woman, can anticipate a large range of issues that will arise:
What is to be the relationship between the donor and the resulting child? between
the mother's husband and the resulting child? Who has to support the child? From
whom may the child inherit? Who may visit the child if there is/isn't a divorce?
Who must sign off before the child can be adopted? Who may consent to the
child's medical care? Etc., etc.
In fact, these problems hardly ever arise. While artificial insemination by donor
has been practiced in human beings for at least 80 years,1 9 there are only a handful
of reported disputes about these issues. At least in the United States each of them
has been resolved satisfactorily, which is to say that every decision has treated par-
enthood as a social relationship, has maximized the child's chance of being pri-
vately supported, has minimized the likelihood that the state will have to raise the
child, has given the child a chance to have a parental relationship with both a
mother and a father figure, has encouraged husbands to behave responsibly while
refraining from inflicting emotional pain upon them, has provided wives with a
source of support for their child, while discouraging them from acting cruelly, and
has refrained from foisting unwanted obligations onto "donors" and their wives.
20
Nonetheless, opponents of the second best were disturbed by the uncertainty that
judicial decisions left and thought that all issues of AID had to be resolved imme-
diately. In the United States this led to passage of § 5 of the Uniform Parentage
Act 2 and eventually to the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
19 See, Orfordv. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
20 See, e.g., People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968); Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S. 2d
390 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (Suff. Ct. 1973) and discussion in Dworkin (op. cit. fn. 8),
p. 64.
21 Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (1988).
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Act22 as well as to several state statutes.23 The first Act created problems where
none existed before, arguably rendering children illegitimate if sperm "donors"
charged for their sperm, and opening up questions about how to treat husbands of
surrogate mothers as well as other difficulties. USCACA solved some of those pro-
blems, but created others. The state statutes were particularly absurd, creating le-
gitimacy issues where none had existed before, sometimes making felons of wo-
men who performed AID on themselves, etc. 24 The insistence on getting things
right instead of the more modest goal of not getting them too wrong, led to the
creation of problems that did not have to arise and getting things farther from right
than a willingness to tolerate the second best would have.
The lesson for dealing with genetic developments is plain: given the inadequacy
of legal institutions to deal with the issues, we should choose the approach that will
do the least harm. In the genetics context that means that we should refrain from
enacting guidelines or other forms of advance controls until enough cases have
been decided to provide a base from which guidelines can be extrapolated.2 5 This
does not mean that guidelines should be permanently eschewed. It only recognizes
that guidelines that are not rooted firmly in reality are likely to be ill-advised.
Initial reliance on case by case decision making will offer the advantages of
being tied to facts; of being narrowly tailored; of being easy to change; of resting
on reasons that can and should be made apparent; and of providing some guidance
for the future in the sense that they invite analogical reasoning and efforts to tease
out exactly what the relevant aspects of an issue are. It has the disadvantages of
being slow, backward looking, noncomprehensive, and poorly equipped to control
conduct. Why is this tradeoff of advantages and drawbacks the least bad tradeoff to
accept?
First, controlling conduct only makes sense if one is sure what one wants people
to do. Laws that prohibit premeditated murder make sense because there is nearly
universal agreement that premeditated murder is a bad thing. Even with such a
clear example, however, room for debate exists if one begins to think about eutha-
nasia rather than murder for hire. When the desired course of conduct is less clear,
then the ability to control conduct may be a curse rather than a blessing. Advance
decision making could prohibit stem cell research or use, human cloning, presymp-
tomatic genetic testing of children, or the consideration of genetic predispositions
22 Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 9B U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994).
23 E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 43-34-42 (1994).
24 For a discussion of the state and Uniform Acts, see, Dworkin (op. cit. fn. 8) pp. 65 -69.
25 As suggested above (see, section III. Cases), at least one group of scholars has at-
tempted to accelerate the process by resolving a number of cases quickly and then preparing
guidelines that emerged from the case analyses. See, Smith, et al. (op. cit. fn. 6). The authors
were able to proceed fairly quickly because they were an unofficial group that did not have to
obtain agreement from any of the various relevant constituencies and because they dealt only
with one set of problems: those posed by presymptomatic diagnosis of autosomal dominant
disorders.
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in setting insurance rates. But in each of those cases whether prohibiting the con-
duct is desirable is open to serious question.
Enormous potential benefits may flow from stem cell research. Cloning too may
contribute to the amelioration of human misery. Presymptomatic testing of chil-
dren, even if no medical options are available for them, may lead to better parent-
ing decisions, making needed resources available to children who will develop a
disease, directing such children into the most suitable careers for them, etc. Allow-
ing what many like to call genetic discrimination in insurance may keep insurance
premiums lower than they would otherwise be for the rest of the population, thus
permitting persons at the margin to obtain health insurance they could not other-
wise afford. Conduct control is a mixed blessing. When values are in doubt and in
flux, it is probably no blessing at all.
Similarly, slowness of response is only an evil if one is so sure about the right
course to take and the urgency of taking it that speed is necessary to avert serious
harm. In an area like genetics where we do not know what harm we are talking
about and where rapid response may prevent the achievement of good, slow re-
sponse is the more prudent course.
A lack of comprehensiveness is also a virtue rather than a vice when the best
course of conduct is in doubt. Painting with a narrow brush avoids sweeping mis-
takes. It offers an easy way to correct the mistakes that it does make. And it offers
hints of future lines of development that are likely to be sound.
The one real drawback of case by case decision making is that it is backward
looking. To the extent that it is rooted in precedent and analogical reasoning, it
seeks today's solutions in answers to yesterday's problems. If issues posed by ge-
netic advance are qualitatively different than issues that have arisen in the past, that
suggests a limit on our imagination that is undesirable. However, even this draw-
back is not as bad as it first appears to be. First, only some of the issues posed by
genetics are qualitatively different than issues that have arisen before. Insurance
discrimination, medical decision making for children, and control of research are
old issues that simply arise in new contexts as genetics develops. Second, really
different questions, such as whether we should reformulate the entire criminal law
to reflect advancing knowledge about genetic effects on behavior, have similarities
to old issues, like the proper role of the insanity defense, but also raise such pro-
found issues about the nature of humanity that any great leap forward in approach
will depend on a quantum leap in human imagination and ingenuity. Whether free-
ing decision makers from the chains of precedent will produce such extraordinary
ingenuity is an open question.
Thus, the costs of relying on cases in the short run seem relatively small. None-
theless, they are costs. That is why they should only be tolerated for a reasonable
amount of time. Eventually enough cases will have been decided about each ques-
tion posed by genetic developments to illuminate the issues involved sufficiently
to permit the drafting of guidelines or other forms of advance regulation that will
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make sense. If the case resolution process has worked optimally, the guidelines
will simply be a generalized extrapolation from the case decisions. If the case reso-
lution process has worked less well, the guideline drafters may use the case resolu-
tions as examples of erroneous or misguided approaches to problems and draft
guidelines that take different approaches. Either way, the post-cases "advance deci-
sions" will be much more likely to be sound than they would be if they were writ-
ten before cases had been resolved. Informed by the cases the guidelines will be
fact-based, responsive to real, rather than hypothetical social problems, and ad-
dressed to specific problems, rather than scatter gun attacks on the field of genetics
as a whole. They will come after a period of relatively little regulation. That means
that we will have had a chance to see whether either the fears or the promises of
genetic developments are realistic. Once the guidelines are enacted, they will pro-
vide the advantages that advance decision making offers: conduct control, cer-
tainty, and as much comprehensiveness as seems warranted. All that will have been
lost is speed.
Two obvious questions remain: (1) How much speed is it tolerable to lose? That
is, how long should the period of case by case decision making that precedes
guideline drafting be? (2) What does the recommended approach suggest about the
desirability of efforts to deal internationally or globally with social issues posed by
genetics?
The first question is impossible to answer with any degree of specificity. If case
resolution has revealed that no real problem exists, then no guidelines should be
drafted. Otherwise, guidelines should not be drafted until enough cases have been
decided so that we can be sure that a problem does exist; that we understand its
parameters; that we understand the relevant facts; and that the issues to be resolved
and the consequences of the different possible resolutions are known. The more
severe the problem, the more tolerable it will be to err on the side of premature
drafting of guidelines. As always, the risks of overreacting must be balanced
against the risks of inaction. In general, however, I would expect the pre-guideline
period to last for a number of years.
The costs of advance decision making are exacerbated if the decisions are ap-
plicable in more than one country. Therefore, adopting the proposed approach ne-
cessarily commits one to eschewing international or global approaches to genetic
developments at this time. 26 Justice Brandeis made the point that one of the great
benefits of American federalism is that the states can serve as laboratories, each
trying out different approaches to dealing with problems, so that ultimately we will
have some idea what the best (or least bad) solution may be. 27 The same point can
be made about the countries of the world. International experimentation regarding
26 For an argument against international approaches to the regulation of germ-line therapy
see, Andrea Bonnicksen, "National and International Approaches to Human Germ-Line Gene
Therapy", 13 Politics & the Life Sciences 39, 46-47 (1994).
27 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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regulation should eventually lead to sounder world-wide responses than premature
international cooperation would.28
Thus, consideration of the relative advantages and drawbacks of cases and
guidelines leads to the conclusion that we should pursue a period of case by case
resolution of social issues posed by genetics as a necessary precursor to the devel-
opment of guidelines.
Zusammenfassung
Die Entwicklungen der Genetik versprechen einerseits enorme Vorteile fUr die
Gesellschaft, bedrohen sie andererseits aber auch mit substantiellen Nachteilen.
Eine auf der Hand liegende Frage, die sich daraus ergibt, ist die, wie man diese
Entwicklungen steuern und die Vorteile maximieren, die Risiken aber minimieren
kann. Im vorliegenden Artikel werden die relativen Vorzaige von Richtlinien und
anderen Arten der Vorabentscheidung auf der einen Seite und von Entscheidungen
von Fall zu Fall, wie sie insbesondere von Gerichten getroffen werden, auf der
anderen Seite untersucht, und zwar im Hinblick auf ihre Eignung, die Herausfor-
derung einer Regulierung der genetischen Entwicklungen zu beantworten.
Dabei werden zunachst die Charakteristika der gentechnologischen Entwicklung
diskutiert: die Geschwindigkeit der Entwicklung, die Wichtigkeit der Fakten, die
wissenschaftliche Natur der relevanten Fakten, die Unsicherheit im Hinblick auf
die Signifikanz der Entwicklungen, die weitreichenden Implikationen sowohl der
Entwicklungen als auch der Versuche, sie zu regulieren, und schliel31ich das Fehlen
eines moralischen Konsenses dariiber trotz an sich tiefer moralischer Uberzeugun-
gen. Danach werden die Eigenschaften von Mechanismen diskutiert, Entscheidun-
gen vorab zu treffen, und zwar sowohl allgemein als auch im Hinblick auf spe-
zielle Weisen der vorausgehenden Entscheidungsfindung, um herauszufinden, ob
sie geeignet sind, mit gesellschaftlichen Problemen der Genetik umzugehen. Das-
selbe wird sodann im Hinblick auf Entscheidungsmechanismen untersucht, die von
Fall zu Fall vorgehen.
Die Er6rterungen kommen zu dem Ergebnis, daB Vorab-Entscheidungen (etwa
durch gesetzliche Regelungen) zur gegenwdrtigen Zeit verfriiht wdren und von
ihnen abzuraten ist. Die Methode der Entscheidungen von Fall zu Fall hat dem-
gegenilber gewisse Vorteile, aber auch sie ist bei der Behandlung von Problemen
wie den vorliegenden nicht optimal. Nachdem festgestellt wurde, daB wahrschein-
lich keiner der Ansiitze perfekt ist und man allenfalls hoffen kann, so wenig gravie-
rende Fehler zu machen wie m6glich, wird ftir einen kombinierten Ansatz pladiert.
28 Theoretically, this point leads to the conclusion that it may be desirable for some coun-
try to reject the proposed approach and adopt guidelines now. That may well be a useful ex-
periment. However, a country that adopted guidelines that restricted its physicians and scien-
tists more stringently than other countries did, might well find itself at an unacceptable com-
petitive disadvantage.
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Es wird ein Verfahren vorgeschlagen, das nach einer Phase der Entscheidungs-
findung von Fall zu Fall einen Zeitabschnitt vorsieht, in dem Richtlinien aus den
vorangehenden Von-Fall-zu-Fall-Entscheidungen abgeleitet werden. Dieses Ver-
fahren wird wahrscheinlich dem am nichsten kommen, was realistischer Weise am
ehesten (bei minimalen Kosten) eine zufriedenstellende Losung beim gesellschaft-
lichen und rechtlichen Umgang mit den Problemen gewihrleistet, vor die uns die
gentechnologische Entwicklung gestellt hat.

